A tax regime similar to those already in place in Spain and the United Kingdom, aligned with the OECD, whose success will depend on legal certainty and the network of treaties
On October 15, 2026, the Chilean government presented amendments to the Capital Markets Reform bill (Bulletin No. 18,643-05) that establish a special tax regime for holding companies. Based on the participation exemption, it aims to position Chile as a platform for structuring investments in Latin America—a role currently fulfilled primarily by Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The bill is in the initial stages of the legislative process; if approved, it would take effect on January 1, 2027.
The Underlying Issue
In the Tax Foundation’s 2026 International Tax Competitiveness Index, Chile ranks last in the “international tax rules” component. Currently, a Chilean corporation that receives dividends or capital gains from foreign subsidiaries pays corporate income tax, with a foreign tax credit subject to caps; when these earnings are distributed to non-residents, they are also subject to withholding tax (Additional Tax).
Law No. 21,850, approved in October 2026, reduces the corporate tax rate from 27% to 23% in 2029 and restores full integration: the maximum combined tax burden reaches 40% for residents and 35% for foreign investors from treaty countries. This reform improves the tax treatment of investments in Chile, but not that of investments channeled through Chile. The previous attempt—the “platform companies” under Article 41 D—was based on the fiction of treating them as non-residents However, it led to uncertainty and litigation, and was eventually repealed in 2022.
What the New Regime Proposes
The regime operates on two levels. The holding company is exempt from corporate income tax on dividends and capital gains from qualifying participations in foreign entities, excluding the portion attributable to assets located in Chile. Its non-resident shareholders are exempt from the Additional Tax on those dividends and on the gain from the sale of shares in the holding company, proportionate to the foreign ownership interest.
A participation qualifies if it amounts to 5% of the voting capital, is held for one year, and corresponds to an entity engaged in active business, subject to a nominal tax rate of at least 10%—presumed if a tax treaty applies—and not resident in a tax haven. The holding company must demonstrate effective management, personnel, and sufficient resources in Chile. Expenses associated with exempt income, including acquisition interest, are not deductible.
Chile Compared to Spain and the United Kingdom
Spain applies the special regime of Entities Holding Foreign Securities (ETVE). The United Kingdom achieves the same result through general rules: a broad dividend exemption and the Substantial Shareholding Exemption (SSE).
Element | Chile (proposal) | Spain (ETVE) | United Kingdom |
Nature | Optional special regime | Optional special regime | General Rules |
Minimum Participation | 5% of the voting capital | 5% | 10% (SSE) |
Holding Period | 1 year | 1 year | 12 months within the previous 6 years (SSE) |
Exemption for the holding company | 100% | 95% (effective rate approx. 1.25%) | 100% |
Minimum taxation of the subsidiary | Nominal rate of 10%, deemed under a treaty | Nominal rate of 10% | Not required; subsidiary must be a trading entity (SSE) |
Substance required | Effective management, personnel, and resources; decisions made in Chile | Own physical and human resources | No specific requirement |
Dividends to non-residents | Exempt if derived from foreign income | No withholding tax if derived from exempt income | No withholding tax in general |
Sale of the holding company by non-residents | Exempt to the extent attributable to foreign income | Not taxed on the portion attributable to foreign income | Generally not taxed |
Tax havens | Excluded | Excluded | No specific exclusion; CFC and anti-abuse rules |
The Chilean proposal is, in essence, an ETVE, with even more generous exemptions. It differs in that it requires more substance and operates with a network of treaties that is less extensive than the European one but more concentrated in the region, where it is even more advantageous in terms of withholding taxes on dividends received. For example, a dividend from Mexico or Ecuador is subject to a 5% tax burden if routed through Chile, compared to 11.25% through a Spanish ETVE, taking into account withholding tax at source and effective taxation in Spain; from Peru, 5% versus 6.25%.
A Numerical Example
A foreign investor from a treaty country controls, through a holding company, a Latin American subsidiary that earns 100 in profit, is taxed at 20% at source, and distributes the remainder without withholding. That dividend and a capital gain of 100 from the sale of the subsidiary—which is not taxed at source—are compared with Chilean tax rates effective in 2029.
Holding company located in | Net dividend | Total tax burden on the dividend | Net capital gain | Total tax burden on the capital gain |
Chile (general regime) | 65.00 | 35.00% | 65.00 | 35.00% |
Chile (proposed holding company regime) | 80.00 | 20.00% | 100.00 | 0.00% |
Spain (ETVE) | 79.00 | 21.00% | 98.75 | 1.25% |
Holding company located in | Net dividend | Total burden on the dividend | Net capital gain | Total burden on capital gain |
United Kingdom | 80.00 | 20.00% | 100.00 | 0.00% |
Without the regime, Chile’s total tax burden reaches 35%—of which Chile levies 18.75% on dividends received by the holding company—and charges between 14 and 35 points more than its peers; with the regime, the tax burden is limited to that of the country of origin, placing Chile on an equal footing.
Illustrative example. The tax burdens are total and include, in the dividend, the 20% paid at source. In Spain, 95% is exempt, and the remaining 5% is taxed at 25%. Fully usable foreign tax credits are assumed.
The OECD’s Perspective
BEPS Action 5 challenges tax regimes that are isolated from the domestic economy (ring-fencing) and lack substantial activity. The former regime under Article 41 D, which Chile maintained and which was reserved for foreign shareholders, was a classic example. The new regime is open to any company under the general tax regime, regardless of its owners’ residence; it requires registration with the tax authority and mandates a level of substance exceeding the minimum set by the OECD for holding companies.
Pillar Two confirms this legitimacy: the GloBE rules exclude dividends and gains from qualifying participations from the minimum tax base, recognizing that the exemption for participations prevents double taxation. Chile has not yet enacted legislation to implement these rules, although it is participating in the process.
Why Chile?
The regime merely puts Chile on the starting line. The question for a global investor is why locate their Latin American holding company in Santiago rather than in Madrid, Amsterdam, Luxembourg, or London. Chile does not compete in terms of the breadth of its tax treaties or access to European directives; its proposition is to be the holding company with real substance in the region where the business is located.
• A network of treaties focused on Latin America: Of its 37 treaties in force, eight cover Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay; the others cover the main sources of capital flowing into the region, such as the United States, Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Japan, China, and South Korea.
• Reciprocal investment protection: Chile has 34 trade agreements with more than 60 economies—several with blocs such as the European Union, the CPTPP, or the Pacific Alliance—as well as bilateral investment agreements that grant national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, protection against expropriation, and international arbitration. A holding company with substance in Chile is better positioned to qualify as a Chilean investor under these treaties, combining tax efficiency and legal protection.
• Substance where management already exists: Given the principal purpose test under the Multilateral Instrument and Pillar Two, it is difficult to justify a European holding company without actual operations. For groups with regional teams in Latin America, locating the holding company in Chile transforms that management into substance at a lower cost.
• Stability and financial strength: Law No. 21,850 offers tax certainty for 10, 15, or 20 years. Chile has a sovereign rating in Category A (A2 from Moody’s, A from S&P, and A- from Fitch), an autonomous central bank, a banking sector regulated under Basel III, and one of the deepest capital markets in the region, supported by pension funds and insurance companies. For a regional holding company, this means access to competitive local financing and solid banking counterparties.
The proposal has limitations: for assets in Europe, European centers will remain superior, and the Chilean regime lacks established administrative practice. Its natural niche consists of groups and funds whose portfolios and management teams are based in Latin America.
Conclusion
With this regime, Chile is moving beyond the logic of Article 41 D. It no longer seeks an exceptional or isolated regime, but rather aims to converge with the standards of the leading holding jurisdictions: exemption for participations, minimum taxation at source, and substance-over-form principles.
Therefore, the challenge lies not in the technical design, but in offering what no single regulation can guarantee on its own: legal certainty, regulatory stability, and a competitive network of tax treaties. This trend is not unique to Chile: Colombia implemented its holding company regime in 2018, while Peru is currently evaluating similar mechanisms. In this competitive landscape, global investors will not choose the jurisdiction with the best law, but rather the one that demonstrates that the law will be applied predictably for decades and that is capable of enhancing it with a dynamic business environment.
If Chile overcomes this challenge, it can become the natural platform for organizing investments in Latin America from within Latin America. More than just a tax reform, the regime represents a strategic definition of the role Chile intends to play in Latin America’s investment architecture over the coming decades.
Sources
• Draft Law on Capital Markets Reform and Home Financing, Official State Gazette No. 18,643-05, Article 23 (Special Regime for Holding Companies).
• Law No. 21,850, published in the Official Gazette on October 17, 2026.
• Spain: Law 27/2014, of November 27, on Corporate Income Tax, Articles 21, 107, and 108.
• United Kingdom: HMRC, Capital Gains Manual CG53070, Substantial Shareholdings Exemption.
• OECD (2015), Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, BEPS Action 5, Final Report.
• OECD (2021), Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two).
• Internal Revenue Service: International tax treaties in force.
• Undersecretariat for International Economic Relations (SUBREI): Chile’s current trade agreements.
• Colombia: Tax Code, Articles 894-898 (Colombian Holding Companies Regime, Law 1943 of 2018, reinstated by Law 2010 of 2019).